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MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

THE LAW, OF PRIMARY ELECTIONS*
4.

REGULATIONS AS TO THE ELECTIONS AND SUFFRAGE.

Under this head I shall consider primarily only those laws
and provisos concerned with the conduct of elections so far as
they relate to the suffrage. In this and the succeeding sections,
it will be observed, many of the decisions hinge on the point
already discussed of whether the primary is to be regarded as an
election within the constitutional meaning of that term.
A Washington law requiring first and second choice voting
was upheld, though the constitution said nothing of it.7o Compulsory second choice voting does not limit or revoke the constitutional provision for "the free and lawful exercise of the right
'7 1

of suffrage."

But a law limiting the voters to the right to cast one ballot for
each of the nominees for representatives in the general assembly, said candidates being named by the senatorial committee,
contravenes the constitutional provision allowing cumulation. or
72
division of votes.
In the following section we shall consider the regulations
affecting the voter and the suffrage.
5. THE VOTERS AND THE SUFFRAGE.
There are two main questions presented under this head:
the problems of registration and the requirement of a test of
party affiliation.
Registration. One of the special topics coming under the general head of "Registration," concerning the requirement of oaths
of party membership, will be treated subsequently. In general,
we may say that where a statute has the effect of disfranchising
citizens who are legal voters under the constitution, it will not
be upheld. This disfranchisement may be direct or indirect.
Thus, in Michigan a law which amounted to a denial of the elective franchise to a large number of voters through no fault of
their own, and making unjust and unlawful discrimination be*Continued from 2 MINNESOTA LAW REVEW,

70 State
71

97.

ex rel. Zent v. Nichols, (1908) 50 Wash. 508, 97 Pac. 728.
Adams v. Lansdon. (1910) 18 Idaho 483, 110 Pac. 280.
72 PCople v. Strassheim, (1909) 240 II. 279, 88 N. E. 821.
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tween the rights of native and naturalized citizens, is unreasonable and'void.7 3 A law forbidding persons to vote whose names
did not appear on the precinct register used at the last general
election or upon its supplement, was declared invalid. It was
held to debar native-born becoming eligible since the last general election, as well as persons naturalized since then and those
74
Requirement of
who had changed their place of residence.
75
unconstitutional.
is
born
foreign
the
proof of naturalization by
This is true generally as it would disfranchise those in other
states when admitted to the union (and enfranchised by the enabling act of Congress) and subsequently moving to the state
enacting the law; it is also true in those states containing foreign born living in the state at the time of its admission. One
who is registered as a member of a political party cannot compel
76
the registry agent to change his party affiliation before election.
Tests of party affiliation. The question as to whether a voter
can be compelled at the time of registry or at the primary election
to put himself on record or take oath as to his general affiliation
with a political party is one of some importance. These tests,
which take various forms, are provided as a means of preserving
the integrity of the party. Their success depends both on their
form and on the manner in which they are enforced. For instance, even though one might have all the desire and reason in
the world to enforce some particular test he might be unable to
do so. An enormous sum of money, for example, would be required to have challengers provided at all the polls irt Chicago
or any other large city, and even if this could be done their acquaintanceship would be limited and they could only perform the
services expected of them to a'limited extent. There is-no doubt
that in many cases voters of one party participate in large numbers, often sufficiently so to determine the party candidate, at the
primary of another party. Thus, in the primary elections of
September, 1916, in the state of Washington, the Democrats,
having few contests of any importance in their own party, took
part in the Republican primary (by a concerted and precon7 Attorney General v. Detroit, (1889) 78 Mich. 545, 44 N. W. 388,

7 L. R. A. 99, 18 Am. St. Rep. 458.

74 Spier v. Baker, (1898) 120 Cal. 370, 52 Pac. 659. 41 L. R. A. 196;
People v. Strassheim, (1909) 240 Ill. 279, 88 N. E. 821. Citicized in
4 Ill. Law Rev. 227-42, by Prof. Greeley.
75 State v. Flaherty, (1912) 23 N. D. 313.. 136 N. W. 76.
78 State v. Keith, (1914) 37 Nev. 452, 142 Pac. 532.
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ceived action and plan, many charge) with the avowed purpose
of nominating Senator Poindexter for re-election and defeating
Congressman Humphrey, Senator Poindexter's only formidable
opponent. And there is no doubt that they accomplished their
purpose.
We have just seen that the requirements of voters at primaries cannot be greater than those at general elections, as provided in the constitution. An exception, however, may be made
in the case of tests of party affiliation, which are generally upheld.
The chief objection on principle to such tests is that they violate the secrecy of the ballot. But the right to vote a secret ballot is neither a natural nor a constitutional right. 77 And the oath
required has been held not to violate the secrecy of the ballot.78
Yet another court seems to admit that such tests violate the
secrecy of the ballot when it says :79 "It is the secrecy of the ballot which the law protects, and not secrecy as to the political party
with which the voter desires to act." In short, there is, seemingly, no unanimity among the courts which do support the principle of such tests, as to why they do so,
A leading case has held that the legislature may provide that
a party committee may establish qualifications for voters at
primary elections in addition to those prescribed by the general
election laws.8 0 This would, however, probably be limited to
qualifications connected with the party as such, and go no farther
than to require some test of party affiliation. Provisions that
voters not members of a political party are excluded are reasonable and proper, where independent nominations may be made by
petition.8 1 One case has even held that the absence of a test of
party affiliation will render a primary law inoperative.8 2 Personally, I doubt if that decision would be very generally followed,
77 Hopper v. Stack, (1903) 69 N. J. L. 562, 56 Atl. 1; State v. Felton,
(1908) 77 Ohio St. 554, 84 N. E. 85; Riter v. Douglass, (1910) 32 Nev.
400, 109 Pac. 444; State v. Michel, (1903) 121 La. 374, 46 So. 430.
78 Hopper v. Stack, supra; Rebstock v. Superior Court, (1905)

Cal. 308, 80 Pac. 65.

79 Katz v. Fitzgerald, (1907) 152 Cal. 433, 93 Pac. 112.

146

Cf. Line v.

Board of Election Canvassers, (1903) 154 Mich. 329, 117 N. W. 730. 16
Ann. Cas. 248.
80 State v. Michel, (1908) 121 La. 374, 46 So. 430.. Contra, In re
Sweeney, (1913) 144 N. Y. S. 60. affirmed 209 N. Y. 567.
81 Ex parte Wilson, (1912) 7 Okla. Cr. 610, 125 Pac. 739; Riter v.

Douglass, (1910) 32 Nev. 400, 109 Pac. 444.

82 Britton v. Election Commissioners, (1900) 129 Cal. 337, 61 Pac.
1115, 51 L.R.A. 115.
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and believe the decision of the Wisconsin court, that a primary
law permitting one to vote for candidates of another party, whom
he does not intend to support, is not unconstitutional, is the imore
83
logical.
Requiring a voter at the time of registration to declare his
party allegiance and to vote only that party's ballot at the primary
is not illegal. 8' He may also be required to express his intention at the time of enrollment to support generally the candidates of his party at the next general election."
One may be
required either when enrolling or at the polls to declare that he
voted for a majority of the candidates of the party at the last
general election or intends to do so at the next.8 6 That is, one
may vote only in the party with which he is affiliated. Such requirements are not unconstitutional as- prescribing added franchise requirements, or restricting the right of suffrage, or violating the secrecy of the ballotY It has been held, though-it is
probably doubtful if it would be generally so, that one who has
registered as a member of a political party cannot compel the
registry agent to change his party affiliation before the time of
election. 8 Requiring the elector to declare that he will not sign
a petition for another candidate after voting at the primary has
been upheld. 9 A provision that one could not vote at the primary who has signed the petition of a candidate of any other
party has been upheld.90 But provisions preventing signers of
one petition from signing a second petition nominating other candidates for the same office, will not ordinarily prevent persons
participating in nominating candidates at the primaries from
signing an independent nominating petition for candidates for the
same office. 1 It will be seen that while the requirements designed
83 State ex rel. Van Alstine v. Frear, (1910) 142 Wis. 320, 125 N. W.
961, 20 Ann. Cas. 633.
84 Schostag v. Cator. (1907) 151 Cal. 600, 91 Pac. 502.

85 People v. Democratic General Committee, (1900) 164 N. Y. 335,
58 N. E. 124.

88 Ladd v. Holmes, (1901) 40 Ore. 167, 66 Pac. 714; Hopper v. Stack,
(1903) 69 N.J. L. 562, 56 Atl. 1; State v. Felton, (1908) 77 Ohio St.
554, 84 N. E. 85; Morrow v. Wipf, (1908) 22 S. D. 146, 115 N. W. 1121;
State v. Michel. (1908) 121 La. 374, 46 So. 430; State v. Drexel, (1904)
74 Neb. 776, 105 N. W. 174.
8sState v. Flaherty, (1912) 23 N. D. 313, 136 N. W. 76.
88 State v. Keith, (1914) 37 Nev. 452, 142 Pac. 532.
89 Katz v. Fitzgerald, (1907) 152 Cal. 433, 93 Pac. 112.
90 Rouse v. Thompson, (1906) 228 Ill. 522, 81 N' E. 1109; State v.
Michel, (1908) 121 La. 374, 46 So. 430.
91 State v. Harmon, (1912) 35 Nev. 189, 127 Pac. 221; State v. Burdick, (1896) 6 Wyo. 448, 46 Pac. 854, 34 L. R. A. 845.
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to determine party affiliation and to preserve the integrity of the
political party vary in different states, yet in many respects, certainly so far as the underlying principle is concerned, they ar
similar in all. The various tests provide the only method by
which the purposes of the statutes confining the voter to one
ballot may be so effectuated as to in any appreciable degree preof anvent the voters of one party from invading the primaries
92
latter.
the
in
contests
are
there
when
especially
other,
But a voter at a primary election cannot be required to declare his intention to support the nominee 3 or that he will support
the nominees selected by delegates selected at the primary, since
such a requirement is special legislation in favor of and against
certain classes of individuals. However, this is not really inconsistent with the previously cited cases requiring an elector to
state his intention to support generally the party nominees.
It has been held that the voter has a right to vote for persons not named in the printed ballot and that statutes specifically
granting that right are not unconstitutional. 94 In Nevada, however, though provision is made for blank spaces on the ballot, the
voter, with one exception, cannot write in names.9 5
6.

REGULATIONS

CONCERNING CANDIDATES.

A. Definitions; Nominations; Withdrawals.- One who offers
98
himself, or is offered by others, for an office is- a candidate.
97
Just when
He may be a candidate even though not nominated.
does a man become a candidate? Since the law of primary elections is still in a rather formative stage there have been few decisions upon the point. The two leading cases are in direct conflict. An Idaho law of 190998 prohibited a candidate for nomina-

tion from expending to promote his nomination over 15% of the
salary of the office sought and made mandatory the filing of an
itemized statement of expenditures not over 10 days after the
92in addition to the previously cited -cases upholding such tests,
see Commonwealth v. Rogers, (1902) 181 Mass. 184, 63 N. E. 421; Sher-

man v. People, (1904) 210 Ili. 552, 71 N. E. 618; People v. Election

Commissioners, (1906) 221 II1. 9, 77 N. E. 321; State ex rel. Zent v.
Nichols, (1908) 50 Wash. 508, 97 Pac. 728-31; Bell v. State, (1914) 11
Okla. Cr. 37, 141 Pac. 804.
Spier v. Baker, (1898) 120 Cal. 370, 52 Pac. 659, 41 L. R. A. 196.
93
9
4"Farrell v. Hucken, (1914) 125 Minn. 407, 147 N. W. 815; State
v. Tallman, (1914) 82 Wash. 141, 143 Pac. 874.
95 In re Primary Ballots, (1910) 33 Nev. 129, 126 Pac. 643.
96 1 Bouvier's Law Dictionary, 417. McCamant v. Olcott, (1916) 80
Ore. 246, 156 Pac. 1034, L. R. A. 1916E 706.
'I Leonard v. Commonwealth, (1886) 112 Pa. 622, 4 Ati. 220.
981daho Laws 1909 p. 126.
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primary election. In a case coming before it the court held:99
(1) a person is a candidate when expending money in any way designed to increase or enhance his ultimate chances of nomination;
(2) in the itemized statement must be included all items contracted or paid prior to filing the nomination papers as well as
those subsequent thereto. In Minnesota the law 00 said all candidates must file within 30 days after the primary a verified statement of expenditures. The court declared'' that one becomes a
candidate at the time of filing his affidavit of intention to become
a candidate, and the statement need not include items of expense
incurred or paid prior to the time of filing such affidavit. The
Minnesota view simply means that a man might delay filing his
nomination papers until the last minute, in the meanwhile spending as much money as he wished to securd the nominations. The
Idaho viewpoint on the whole seems more conducive to fair
elections.0 2 Candidates at the primaries for positions on party
committees are not candidates for public offices.' 0 3 Where nomination by convention is forbidden, the nominees of conventions
may subsequently become candidates at the primaries. 0 4 Where
the legislature forbids the withdrawal of candidates nominated at
the primary, the court cannot allow a candidate to withdraw even
for deserving reasons.105
B. Qualifications. Requiring a candidate to state that he is a
member, and that he supported the ticket at the last general election, of the party in which he is a candidate, is valid.10 8 -Provisions by statute that votescast for one as candidate of a political
party with which he is not enrolled be not counted, have been upheld.lr Yet one may become the candlidate of a new party,
A pr6vision requirthough not enrolled as a member thereof. 10
99 Adams v. Lansdon, (1910) 18 Idaho 483, 110 Pac. 280.
200 Minn- Rev. Laws 1905 Sec. 350.
101 State ex rel. Brady v. Bates, (1907) 102 Minn. 104, 112 N.W.
1026, 12 Ann. Cas. 105.
102 See discussion 9 Mich. L. Rev. 246-48
117 Md. 10, 82 Atl. 661, Ann. Cas.
103 Usilton v. Bramble, (1911)
1913E 743.
104 State v. Dykeman, (1912) 70 Wash. 599.
105 Donnelly v. Hamilton, (1910) 33 Nev. 418, 111 Pac. 1026.
108 Socialist Party v. Uhl, (1909) 155 Cal. 776, 103 Pac. 181; Hagerv. Robinson, (1913) 154 Ky. 489, 157 S. W. 1138; Gardner v. Ray, (1913)
154 Ky. 509, 157 S. W. 1147.
107 Defoe v. Tucker, (1913) 174 Mich. 472, 140 N. W. 641; State ex
rel. Murphy v. Graves, (1914) 91 Ohio 36, 109 N. E. 590.
108 Defoe v. Tucker, supra; Hart v. Jordan, (1914) 168 Cal. 321,
143 Pac. 537.
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ing one to say he is a candidate before placing his name on the
ballot is unconstitutional, since it restricts the voters from choosing one who declines himself to seek office. 10 9
C. Name on Two Ballots. Can a candidate have his name
placed on two ballots-be the candidate of two parties-at the

primary? So far as I am aware no cases have arisen where a
man tried to be a candidate for two different offices at the same
primary election, but any such attempt would probably be discountenanced by the courts. As to whether he may be a candidate in two parties for the same office is disputed by the courts.
A New York statute forbidding a committee of a political party,
said committee being authorized to make nominations, to nominate for an office on the party ticket a person who is the candidate
of another party for the same office is unconstitutional. 110 Said
Mr. C. J. Cullen: "Legislation to be valid, must not only not deprive the elector of his right to vote for whom he will, but for
what candidate he will, and it must not discriminate in favor of
one set of candidates against another set." On the filing of a
legal petition in both parties, it has been held in Illinois, though
not by the court, that the election commissioners must put a
name on the primary ballots of both parties, and the board has no
power to require the candidate to elect on which primary ballot
his name shall appear."" Where the members of a party only may
participate in the primary of that party and in the absence of
legislative restrictions on the candidates, one may become the
candidate of two parties for the same office."

2

"The right which

the law gives a person to be the nominee of two parties is a valuable right, and it cannot be taken away by anyone or in any man11
ner other than as provided in the code." '
On the, other hand, it has been declared that under a "closed
primary" law no political party can. be compelled to present as its
candidate at a general election one who does not affiliate with
109

Dapper v. Smith, (1904) 138 Mich. 104, 101 N. W. 60.

1o Matter of Callahan, (1910) 200 N. Y. 59, 140 Am. St. Rep. 626.
In accord: Hopper v. Britt, (1912) 204 N. Y. 524, 98 N. E. 86. That
a person has a right to vote for anyone eligible see also People v. Election Commissioners, (1906) 221 Ill. 9, 18, 77 N. E. 321. Supporting
the view that one may be a candidate in two parties, see also State v.
Seibel, (1914) 262 Mo. 220, 171 S. W. 69; In re Clerk, (N. J. 1913) 88
AtI. 694.
"l Opinion to Election Commissioners by Donald R. Richberg, 47
Chicago Legal News 31-32.
112 Hart v. Jordan, (1914) 168 Cal. 321, 143 Pac. 537.
13 State v. Superior Court, (1912) 70 Wash. 662, 127 Pac. 310.
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it. 1 14

Again, a candidate cannot file nomination papers under a

second party. 11"5 Another court holds that one is not entitled to
have his name on two ballots, though one party might nominate
all the nominees of the other party. 1 16 That is the most radical and

far-reaching decision on the point enunciated by our courts. In
Kentucky it has been held that nominations on two party ballots
are not practicable under their primary law." 7 On the whole, I
think we may safely say that in general one will be permitted to
have his name, if properly presented, on two, or even more, ballots at the primary election, provided there is no qualification that
a candidate must be a member of the party whose nomination he
seeks.
D. Filing Fees. There is no doubt that a firing fee may be
required of a candidate-at the primary." 8 A leading case 1 9 holds
that the fee required is a regulation, and not an additional qualification for office-holding. The court declared that it was justified under the police power, since it would prevent persons from
placing names on the ballots for fraudulent purposes, such as to
draw strength in small localities from one candidate to benefit
another. Yet such fees must be imposed with caution, since
every eligible person has the right to be a candidate without being
subjected to arbitrary and unreasonable buraens of any character.
With this is coupled the voter's right to choose any eligible
person as a candidate. Such fees must be reasonable, and not
arbitrary, unwarranted, and unnecessary.' 2 0 They must bear a
relation to the service performed by the recording officer.' 2 ' The
problem, in every case, is one of fact, as to whether the 'fee re114
11
116

239.

State v. Wells, (1912) 92 Neb. 337, 138 N. W. 165.
State ex rel. Thatcher v. Brodigan, (Nev. 1914) 142 Pac. 520.

State v. Anderson, (1898) 100 Wis. 523, 76 N. W. 482, 42 L. R. A.

117 Francis v. Sturgill, (1915)

163 Ky. 650, 174 S: W. 753.
118 Some leading cases are Riter v. Douglass, (1910) 32 Nev. 400,
109 Pac. 444; State ex rel. Larsen v. Scott, (1910) 110 Minn. 461, 126
N. W. 70 (citing other Minnesota cases in accord); Socialist Party v.
Uhl, (1909) 155 Cal. 776, 103 Pac. 181; State ex rel. Zent v. Nichols,
(1908) 50 Wash. 508. 97 Pac. 728.
119 State ex rel. Ruggle v. Brodigan, (Nev. 1914) 143 Pac. 238.
120 Riter v. Douglass, (1910) 32 Nev. 400, 109 Pac. 444; Johnson v.
Grand Forks County, (1907) 16 N. D. 363, 113 N. W. 1071; Ballinger
v. McLaughlin, (1908) 22 S. D. 206, 116 N.W. 70; State v. Drexel,
(1904) 74 Neb. 776, 105 N. W. 174; Ledgerwood v. Pitts, (1910) 122
Tenn. 571, 125 S.W. 1036.
121 Ballinger v. McLaughlin. (1908) 22 S. D. 206. 116 N.W. 70.
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quired does bear a reasonable relation to the services performed
in filing the petition.
Provisions for the payment of filing fees from $10 to $50
have been upheld."2 2 In Nevada a $100 filing fee for a salaried
state office has been upheld. 2 ' A requirement that 1% of the
yearly salary be paid as a fee has been upheld.' 2 ' For one, I do not
believe that any fee based on a proportion of the salary to be received should be upheld, it being very difficult to see how this
can be reconciled with the view, held by practically all the
courts, that the fee should bear a relation to the services performed by the recording and filing officers. Surely there is no
more service performed in filing the petition of a candidate for
governor than for one who wishes to go to the state legislature.
This, however, is not the attitude adopted by the courts, and
even where requirements are not upheld, it is because they
are exorbitant and unreasonable.
A requirement that a candidate should pay 2% of the salary of the office for which he filed was declared unconstitutional. 12 5

A requirement of 1% of the term's salary is in-

valid. 26 Fees ranging from $25 to $100 for the same primary
election have not been upheld. 12 since they bore no relation
to the services rendered in filing the papers or to the expenses
of the election. The fees of an election can not be assessed
among the candidates, the amount varying, with the office
sought. 128 No refund is allowed if the candidate withdraw before the election. 1 29

A defeated candidate cannot recover his

fee, and the law is not invalid because of that fact, since he
was not compelled to become a candidate and to deposit the
money."10 But where the fee has been exacted under an unconstitutional statute and paid under protest, it may be re122Socialist Party v. Uhl, (1909) 155 Cal. 776, 103 Pac. 181; Kenneweg v. County Commissioners, (1905) 102 Md. 119. 62 Atl. 249; State
ex rel. Thompson v. Scott, (1906) 99 Minn. 145, 108 N. W. 828.
123 State ex rel. Ruggle v. Brodigan, (Nev. 1914) 143 Pac. 238.
z24 State ex rel. Boomer v. Nichols, (1908) 50 Wash. 529, 97 Pac. 733.
125 Johnson v. Grand Forks County, (1907) 16 N. D. 363, 113 N. W.
1071.
120 Morrow v. Wipf, (1908) 22 S.D. 146, 115 N. W. 1121; State v.
Drexel, (1904) 74 Neb. 776. 105 N. W. 174.
127 People v. Election Commissioners, (1906) 221 I11. "9, 77 N. E.
321. Similarly, fees ranging from $10 to $500, Ledgerwood v. Pitts,
(1910) 122 Tenn. 571, 125 S. W. 1036.
128 Ledgerwood v. Pitts, supra.
129 State ex rel. Thatcher v. Brodigan', (Nev. 1914) 142 Pac. 520.
1"0 State v. Michel, (1908) 121 La. 374, 46 So. 430.
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covered by action.13' Where the voter has a legal right to
write or paste on the ballot the name of any person, candidates are not required to pay any filing fee when nominated by
the writing of their names on the ballots, or otherwise than
by filing a regular declaration of candidacy or by 32seeking
nomination at the hands of a nominating convention.1
E. Contributions and Expenditures. Limiting one's expenditures to a certain percentage of the salary of the office sought
does not deprive one of the right of free speech. 33 Corrupt practice acts requiring candidates for public office at the primary to
file statements of expenses in connection therewith do not apply
to members of party committees elected at such elections,' 34 they
not being candidates for public offices.
F. Election Pledges. The pledges required or implied of
legislators who, under our old system, were to vote for United
States Senators, and of presidential electors, will be considered
later. A provision requiring one to say he is a candidate before
placing his name on the ballot has not been upheld. 3 5 It was
held to restrict the voters from choosing one who declined himself
to seek office. But a provision makiffg mandatory the filing by a
candidate of a declaration that if successful he will qualify for
office is not invalid as prescribing qualification for office additional to the constitution.

1 36

G. Unsuccessful Candidates. Laws forbidding defeated candidates to run on an independent ticket have been upheld. 137 In
all of these cases the right has existed to write in names on the
final ballot. It is doubtful if such laws would be upheld if such
a provision did not exist, since it would absolutely preclude the
voters from choosing for an office someone whom the majority
desired to elect.
'3' Johnson v. Grand Forks County, (1907) 16 N. D. 363, 113 N. W.
1071.
32State v. Tallman, (1914) 82 Wash. 141, 143 Pac. 874. Decided by
a divided court, 3-2.
133 Adams v. Lansdon, (1910) 18 Idaho 483, 110 Pac. 280.
34 Usilton v. Bramble. (1911) 117 Md. 10, 82 Atl. 661, Ann. Cas.
1913E 743.
'35 Dapper v. Smith. (1904) 138 Mich. 104, 101 N. W. 60.
236 State ex rel. Van Alstine v. Frear, (1910) 142 Wis. 320, 125 N. W.
961, 20 Ann. Cas. 633.
137 State v. Moore, (1902) 87 Minn. 308, 92 N. W. 4; Lacombe v.
Laborde, (1913) 132 La. 435, 61 So. 518; Winston v. Moore, (1914) 244
Pa. 447, 91 At. 520, Ann. Cas. 1915C 498, L. R. A. 1915A 1190.
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7.

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORS AND SENATORIAL PRIMARIES.

Before the direct election of senators was provided for by the
seventeenth amendment many states had senatorial primaries, in
which the voters were to ballot as to their choice for senator, and
th party legislators were expected to select the choice of the
people, as indicated by popular vote.* The United States constitution, however, gave the choice to the legislators; the question
arose as to whether they could be restricted in any manner in
their choice of senators.
Many of the state laws required candidates for the legislature to pledge themselves to support the candidate receiving the
majority vote of their party at the primary. Such laws, when
brought before the courts, were not upheld. 138 In these two cases
the court rather dodged the issue, however, by saying that in the
last analysis the question could only be determined by the United
States Senate anyway. There is only a moral obligation existing
on the legislators."39 These cases rest on the proposition that to
permit the voters to choose senators, or to allow their selection to
be binding on the legislators, would be an invalid delegation of
legislative power. 140 A provision that United States senators be
nominated in the primary does not bind the legislators to vote
for the party nominee or restrict their choice to persons voted for
at the primary, and hence is not in violation of the United States
constitution and statutes. 14 1 Only in one case, so far as I am
aware, was it held that the requirement of a promise from leg42
islative candidates to support their party nominee was valid.
In the state of Nebraska in 1912 certain men were selected
by the Republicans as presidential electors. After the progressive revolt the majority of these men announced their intention
to support Colonel Roosevelt. Suit was brought to compel the
secretary of state to place on the ballot as Republican presidential electors the names of certain "regular" Republicans in place
of the "bolters." The court upheld the right of the Republican
party to place other names on the ballot, 43 declaring that presi138 State ex rel. McCue v. Blaisdell. (1908) 18 N. D. 55, 118 N. W.
141; State v. Beery, (1908) 18 N.D. 75, 118 N.W. 150.
239 State ex rel. McCue v. Blaisdell and State v. Beery, supra; Socialist Party v. Uhl. (1909) 155 Cal. 776.. 103 Pac. 181.
140 See note in 22 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1135.
141 State ex rel. Van Alstine v. Frear, (1910) 142 Wis. 320, 125 N. W.
961, 20 Ann. Cas. 633.
142 State v. Michel, (1908) 121 La. 374, 46 So. 430.
143 State v. Wait, (1912) 92 Neb. 313, 138 N. W. 159.
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dential electors impliedly pledge themselves to vote, if elected, for
the persons who may subsequently be nominated by the national
convention of their party. If they announce their intention to do
otherwise after the convention their office is forfeited and a vacancy occurs. They cannot continue as electors of a party-and
refuse to support the party caididate.
8.

RESULTS OF ELECTIONS; CONTESTS; VACANCIES.

A. Election Results. After an election the right of successful candidates to their offices is not affected by the unconstitution14
ality of the primary act under which they were nominated. 1
This is presumably on the ground that the people having spoken,
and the popular will being above that of any department of the
government, the judiciary would be powerless to put a man out
of office on such a ground. The case is analogous to the adoption of a constitution framed in an unconstitutional manner. A
provision that a candidate getting over 50% of the total vote for
the office sought and of the total ballots cast be the sole nominee
on the ballot at the general election has been upheld. 145

Limit-

ing the names on the official ballot to the two candidates receiving the highest votes at the primary does not violate the provi146
sion that all elections shall be free and equal.
B. Contests. In two Arkansas cases it was held that laws
making the chancery court a tribunal to hear and determine primary election contests were invalid, holding in the first case 147 that
primaries were not such elections as the legislature was in the
constitution authorized to provide contest boards for, and in the
second case1 48 that parties being unincorporated and voluntary
associations involving no rights of property or personal liberty
could not come into equity and the Democratic party already having a tribunal to hear contests its decisions are final. "The legislature may, within constitutional limitations, regulate primary
elections; but there is a diversity of opinion as to how far legislation may go in creating a tribunal to hear and determine contests outside and beyond the councils of the party and in regu144 People v. Strassheim, (1909) 240 Il1.

279, 88 N. E. 821.

145 Winston v. Moore, (1914) 244 Pa. 447, 91 Atl. 520, Ann.
1915C 498; L.R.A. 1915A 1190.

Cas.

148Note 145, supra.

147 Hester v. Bourland, (1906) 80 Ark. 145, 95 S. W. 992.
148 Walls v. Brundige. (1913) 109 Ark. 250, 160 S. W. 230, Ann. Cas.
1915C 980.
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'
It has been declared that the
lating the procedure therein."149
right of an ineligible person to hold office cannot be tested by the
unsuccessful candidate at the primary, but only in a suit brought
in the name of the state. 150 The county auditor or clerk cannot
pass on the elegibility of candidates and refuse to place names on
the ballot at the general election. 51 On mandamus the court will
take cognizance of the question as to which candidate should appear on the official ballot, before the time.for printing the ballot
arrives. 152 The fact that votes were not challenged at the polls
1 3
does not preclude showing their illegality. " Indeed, if that were
to be the case the stuffing of the ballot box would be made much
easier than it now is, owing to the difficulty and expense involved in challenging. The principal of estoppel may enter to
prevent one from contesting the election of a successful candi-.
date." 4 In case a contest is successful "no election" will be decreed and the office declared vacant. 5

In
C. Vacancies. Vacancies may occur in several ways.
case a candidate dies before the general election ballots cast for
him will not be counted." 6 In the'latter of these two cases it was
held that the ballots were counted as blanks and no vacancy occurred, even if a majority of the votes were cast for the deceased. A majority of the cases hold that the party committee
has power to fill vacancies only after a candidate has been nominated at the primary. That is, no vacancy can occur until a candidate has been nominated."- If there is a tie vote a vacancy
occurs which the party committee may fill."58 A statute provid149 Silas D. Campbell in 77 Cent. L. J. 450-62.
150 Roussel v. Dornier, (1912) 130 La. 367, 57 So. 1007, 39 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 1826. But cf. Francis v. Sturgill, (1915) 163 Ky. 650, 174 S. W.
753.
151 Fuller v. Corey, (1910) 18 Idaho 558, 110 Pac. 1035; Whitaker. v.
Swanner, (1905) 121 Ky. 281, 89 S. W. 184.
152 State v. Goff, (1906) 129 Wis. 668, 109 N. W. 628.
153 Marrero v. Middleton, (1912) 131 La. 432, 59 So. 863.
54 Fuerst v. Semmler, (1914) 28 N. D. 411, 149 N. W. 115.
Cf.
Francis v. Sturgill, (1915) 163 Ky. 650, 174 S. W. 753.
155 Francis v. Sturgill ,supra.
156 In re Primaries, 22 Pa. Dist. 149; State ex rel. Bancroft v. Frear,
(1910) 144 Wis. 79, 128 N. W. 1068.
57 Healey v. Wipf, (1908)
22 S.D. 343, 117 N. W. 521; State v.
Secretary, (1909) 141 Iowa 196, 119 N. W. 620; State ex rel. Corser v.
Scott, (1902) 87 Minn. 313, 91 N. W. 110. Contra, holding that if no
nominations are made, a vacancy has "occurred" and that the proper
party committee may fill it, State v. Wells, (1912) 92 Neb. 337, 138
N. W. 165.
158 Usilton v. Bramble, (1911) 117 Md. 10, 82 Atl. 661. Ann. Cas.
1913E 743.
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ing that the successful candidate must file an acceptance within
ten days after the primary and that a vacancy occurs if he does
not, which the party committee may fill, has been upheld. 15 9 If
presidential electors refuse to support the nominees of their party
their office is forfeited and a vacancy occurs. 60 In case a successful contest occurs "no election" will be decreed by the courts
and the office declared vacant. 6' That is, the contesting party or
the runner-up in the primary obtains no right to a place on the
ballot because his rival's nomination is thrown out.
9. CONCLUSION.

The principle of primary laws has been upheld by all courts,
due perhaps, in some cases at least, to the fact that the courts
refrain, so far as is possible, from any attempt to pass on the
validity of measures of a political nature. Many provisions of
primary laws and of statutes passed to regulate them have, however, been declared invalid. Quite often this has occurred where
the court has taken the view that primaries are within the meaning of constitutional references to "elections ;" the more general
view is that primaries are not "elections." On the whole, we may
say that primary regulations are quite generally upheld, unless
they are clearly arbitrary or unreasonable. "In no field of legislation has the judiciary shown itself more friendly to experiment
than in the regulation of political organizations.

.

.

.

No par-

ticular property rights have been involved, the pressure of public
opinion has been strong and steady, the judges have been conversant with the facts and the philosophy of the party system, and
hence have experienced little difficulty in justifying almost every
kind of a primary system that has been adopted by a legislative
body. . . . If primary laws are not perfect, the courts can62
not be blamed.'1
ST. THOMAS COLLEGE,
ST. PAUL, MINNESOTA.
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159 State ex rel. Sayer v. Junkin, (1910) 87 Neb. 801, 128 N. W. 630.
180 State v. Wait, (1912) 92 Neb. 313, 138 N. W. 159.
161 Francis v. Sturgill, (1915) 163 Ky. 650, 174 S.W. 753.
Written in 1908, but equally
162 Merriam, Primary Elections, 115.
applicable today. Mr. Merriam states that "in California and in Illi-

nois considerable difficulty has been experienced in securing the passage of a law that would meet the approval of the courts." (p. 115.)
After repeated attenpts, the legislatures of both of these states have

partially succeeded in passing laws which meet the approval of the

courts, though, especially in Illinois, the laws might be much improved if the courts took a different attitude towards the constitutional nature of primary laws.

